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          The main objectives of this study were the dynamic relationships of 
various macroeconomic variables to explore how monetary policy affects output 
and especially inflation in Vietnam, and suggest some improvements for 
monetary policy in Vietnam. 
Summary  
 
In 1998-2006, the main contributors of variation are GDP itself and rice 
shocks but are only GDP shocks in 2007-2016. Main drivers of inflation during 
1998-2006 are its own innovations and shocks from external factors. 
Nevertheless, in the following period, they are its own shocks and shocks from 
oil price and domestic credit aggregate. Credit channel is found to have an 
important role in monetary transmission mechanism, while interest rate might 
not be the main instrument of the central bank to control inflation  
Conclusions 
The empirical results and economic conditions in Vietnam suggest that the 
central bank should try to improve the channels for monetary transmission with 
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consideration the movements of foreign variables and implement the 
appropriate policy to counter the effects of these variables.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction and research problems 
For the last 20 years, Vietnam has enjoyed a good economic growth with the average 
annual rate of more than 6%. However, the economy also experienced comparatively 
higher inflation than other emerging economy in the same geographical area as shown in 
the figure below:  
Figure 1: Inflation of some emerging economies in Asia, 1996-2014 
  
Source: World Bank (2017). 
Moreover, inflation in Vietnam is extremely high in 2008 and 2011, and although inflation 
has decreased to normal level in the recent years, policymakers still need to examine this 
phenomenon to avoid a similar scenario happen in the future. 
This paper focuses on monetary policy in Vietnam, and studies the dynamic relationships 
of various macroeconomic variables to explore how monetary policy affects output and 
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especially inflation in Vietnam, and suggest some improvements for monetary policy in 
Vietnam. 
1.2. Research questions 
More specifically, this study aims to answer these questions: 
- How do macroeconomic variables affect output and inflation in Vietnam? 
- How significantly do domestic and foreign variables affect output and inflation in 
Vietnam? 
- What are the main drivers of output growth and inflation in the short-term? 
- What are the implications for monetary policy in Vietnam? 
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2. VIETNAMESE ECONOMY AND MONETARY POLICY 
2.1. An overview of Vietnamese economy 
The economy of Vietnam can be divided into three sub-periods after its unification in 1975, 
namely 1975-1986, 1986-2007, and 2007-now.  
2.1.1. 1975-1986  
From 1975 to 1986, Vietnamese economy is a closed and centralized economy controlled 
entirely by the government (Cima, 1987). This period is characterized by economic 
stagnation with shortages due to inefficiency in distribution and reduction in production, 
high and rising inflation as well as a reduction in foreign aid. Especially, the aid from other 
communist countries decreased significantly due to the termination of Vietnam War (Cima, 
1987 and Vo et al, 2002). Furthermore, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were the only 
component of the economy during this period (Pham, 2016). 
2.1.2. 1986-2007  
In 1986, the government implemented a reform campaign called ‘Doi Moi’ to transform 
the economy from centralized to market-oriented and open for international collaborations. 
SOEs obtained a larger autonomy and still operated as the main structure of the economy. 
In the following years, several policies and innovations were introduced with the focus on 
food, goods, domestic trade and exports. Fundamental markets of the economy, namely 
the markets for money, labor, good, and land were gradually established. In this period, 
the availability of banknotes increased significantly and resulted in a period of 
hyperinflation during 1986-1989, yet the annual GDP growth is relatively low- 3.9%. 
From 1991-1996, because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist 
countries in Eastern Europe, Vietnam lost a significant amount of foreign aids from these 
countries. The government had attempted to complete the transition to a market economy 
and achieved economic stability. The subsidies for SOEs was gradually abandoned. 
Economic policies in this period were evaluated as successful since the economy had 
experienced good GDP growth and rapid poverty reduction while inflation was effectively 
controlled for – inflation rate reduced from over 100% to less than 20% (General Statistics 
Office – GSO, 2017).   
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1997 was the year that the financial crisis happened, amplified, and spread from Thailand 
to other Asian countries. Despite the geographical proximity, Vietnam only experienced 
limited effects from the crisis as its economy remained relatively close. These negative 
effects are mainly a reduction in foreign direct investment (FDI) and a drop in annual GDP 
growth rate (General Statistics Office – GSO, 2017).  
Since 2000, after experiencing slightly negative effects from the Asian financial crisis, the 
economy seemed to recover with a high and stable economic growth – circa 7% annually. 
There are structural changes in the economy as the contribution of industry sector 
increase to approximately a quarter, and several high value-added services came into 
existence in the service sector. There is also a significant increase in exports and imports 
in this period. Moreover, the role of the private sector seemed to be enhanced by the new 
enterprise law, but receive only limited investments from the government comparing to 
that of the state sector. According to Nguyen (2014), it is estimated that the productivity 
of the private sector is much higher than that of the state sector. However, SOEs 
remained to be inefficient yet dominated. In additions, from 2000 to 2001, deflation 
occurred, and in 2002-2007, inflation picked up and increased to 8% in 2007.  
2.1.3. 2007-now 
With Vietnam’s WTO accession in 2007, the economy of Vietnam become more open 
and integrated into the global economy. FDI, exports, and imports enormously increase 
after 2006. However, the 2008 financial crisis exerted a severe impact on Vietnamese 
economy. Due to a decrease in export, the country suffered from significant trade deficit 
comparing to that of the previous period. A large amount of foreign capital outflows 
created a crash on stock markets with a 50% drop in the index. Many firms in the private 
sector struggled or went bankrupt due to rising borrowing costs. The state sector, facing 
low domestic demand and a fall in exports, had accumulated a considerable amount of 
debts. Overall, the economy experienced a low growth rate of 5-6% and high inflation 
from 2008-2012 with the peaks of 23.16% in 2008 and 18.67% in 2011. 
2.1.4. Dollarization in the economy 
At the beginning of the 1990s, when the economy experienced hyperinflation, 
dollarization start to exist in the economy. The substantive loss in value of the domestic 
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currency due to hyperinflation drove the citizens to keep USD as an attempt to protect 
their property. After this period, the problem of dollarization rises again in periods with 
high inflation such as 2007-2011 and weakens in periods with low inflation, namely 1995-
2002. The existence of dollarization in the economy can be seen in real estate sector 
when the price is set in USD or gold. Moreover, movements in gold price and USD value 
are almost instantaneous translated into fluctuations in the price of real estate and 
contribute significantly to the variation of inflation (Nguyen and Nguyen, 2010). 
Furthermore, in a study by Nguyen (2012), dollarization is estimated to remain at 30%.  
2.2. Monetary policy in Vietnam 
2.2.1. The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) 
In general, the SBV only has limited power in designing and conducting monetary policy 
in Vietnam.  
As stated by Vietnam National Assembly, SBV is responsible for preparing reports of 
previous monetary policy operation and economic outlook annually, and submitting a 
proposal for monetary policy operation in the following year to the government. The 
government then revises and possibly adjusts the projection with the consultancy of 
National Monetary Policy Advisory Council. The final projection is sent to National 
Assembly for final approval (1997). 
After receiving the final approval, SBV will implement the monetary policy under the 
supervision of the National Assembly and can make some minor adjustments to changes 
in financial markets. 
2.2.2. The objectives of monetary policy in Vietnam 
The objectives of monetary policy in Vietnam are broad and without a clearly defined 
primary one. These includes stabilizing the value of the currency, promoting socio-
economic development, maintaining national security, and improving living standards 
(Law on the State Bank of Vietnam, 1997). While other countries only focus on price 
stabilization or inflation target, with multiple objectives, the Vietnamese government has 
to choose ones over others among them, namely inflation and economic growth. 
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Many researchers suggest that economic policies in Vietnam indicate that economic 
growth is the primary goal of Vietnamese government (Pham, 2011, To et al., 2012 and 
Pham, 2016). However, as average inflation rate increased significantly from 3.4% in 
1996-2000 to 11.4% in 2006-2010 while average GDP growth rate maintained in the 
range 7%-7.5% in the same period. According to IMF (2006), an inflation rate higher than 
3.6% exerts a negative impact on growth. Therefore, despites an economic growth of 
over 7%, with the inflation rate of 11.4%, Vietnamese government seemed to fail to 
achieve the objective of economic growth (To et al., 2012).  
2.2.3. Financial system in Vietnam 
2.2.3.1. Banking sector 
Before 1988, SBV not only had the functions of a central bank but also operated as a 
commercial bank. In this period, the primary responsibilities of SBV are to support the 
implementation of government’s policies and to help SOEs in financing their activities. In 
1988, the government established first stated-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), and 
SBV then was only a central bank. In 1991, joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) were 
founded. In 1992, foreign-owned banks were allowed to open their branches in Vietnam 
but had to follow strict regulations. For instance, their local capitalization must be USD 
15 million at the minimum, and they could not lend more than 10% of the total capital in 
a single project. First 100% foreign-owned banks are licensed to operate in 2008.  
The banking market is largely controlled by SOCBs as only five SOCBs make up more 
than half of total asset and credit in the market from 1997 to 2008 (SBV, 2017). SOCBs 
have an average chartered capital of approximately 16,000 billion VND (800 million 
USD) in 2010, which is mainly funded by the government. The major customers of 
SOCBs are SOEs (Quach, 2011). 
JSCBs is the second largest type of credit institutions in the market. Their share of total 
asset and credit grew from 11.86% and 11.76% in 1997 to 32.45% and 26.54% in 2008 
respectively (SBC, 2017). JSCBs have a smaller capital size, which is roughly 2000-
3000 billion VND (100-150 million USD), compared to SOCBs. They focused on lending 
to small-medium enterprises and services for individual customers (Quach, 2011). 
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2.2.3.2. Security and financial markets 
In 1996, State Securities Commission (SSC) was established to manage the securities 
market operations. Before 2006, SSC is an independent agency under the supervision 
of Ministry of Finance (MOF), and in 2006, it became a part of MOF.  
The stock market was founded in 2000, and there are two stock exchanges in Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City. In 2006, the Law on Securities Market was introduced to support 
the development of corporate bonds and equity markets and revised in 2010. Since its 
establishment, the stock market has expanded considerably as the market capitalization 
increase from 0.4% of GDP in 2003 to 14.8% of GDP in 2011 (World Bank, 2011). 
According to Nguyen (2014), the stock market has succeeded in helping companies and 
government to mobilize capital and strengthen the disclosure of SOEs. 
After 2007, due to the Financial Crisis, the stock market capitalization dropped 
dramatically from 27.5% of GDP in 2007 to 10.5% in 2008 (World Bank, 20011). 
Moreover, VNI index also decreased significantly from 1000 points in early 2007 to 300 
points in 2009. To mitigate the negative impact of Financial Crisis, the government 
issued several decrees regarding taxes on investor and quota on investments from 
foreign investors in 2009. Moreover, the government also accepted bailout package to 
leverage and avoid the collapse of the market. 
2.2.4. Instruments and innovations of monetary policy in Vietnam  
2.2.4.1. Reserve requirement 
Reserve requirement was introduced in 1990, and had been used extensively by SBV 
before 2000 as a major instrument of monetary policy in Vietnam, but has become less 
important later due to the introduction of new instruments, namely open market operation. 
Reserve requirement levels are categorized and determined based on these following 
criteria: maturity, denominated currency, and types of credit institutions (SBV, 2009). The 
reserve requirement levels for deposits in credit institutions, which provide funds and 
involve in activities to promote the development of the rural area, are lower than those of 
other banks are. Furthermore, the average ratio for deposits in VND is significantly lower 
and less volatile than that in foreign currency (Pham, 2016).  
8 
 
Figure 2: Reserve requirement for VND 1998-2014 
 
Source: Pham (2016: 24). 
For deposits in VND, there are two remarkable movements of reserve requirement ratio 
happening in 1998-2000 and 2007-2009. In details, in 1998-200, the reserve requirement 
ratio dropped from 10% to 5%. This decrease is an attempt of SBV to mitigate the 
negative influence of the Asian Financial Crisis 1997 on state-owned commercial banks 
(SOCBs) in Vietnam (Shimomoto, 1999).  Similarly, noticeable adjustments were made 
during the period from mid-2007 to the beginning of 2008 when the ratio increased from 
5% to 11% in less than one year. Due to WTO’s accession in 2007, a considerable credit 
expansion and inflation pressure from externalities of increasing world commodities 
prices drove SBV to modify the reserve requirement to reduce the negative effects on the 
economy. Furthermore, after the Financial Crisis 2007-2008 already affected Vietnam, 
SBV decreased the ratio rapidly from 11% to 3% within 3 months to alleviate 
consequences of the crisis and increase the liquidity of the economy to encourage 
consumptions and investments (Pham, 2016). 
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Figure 3: Reserve requirement for foreign currency 1998-2014 
 
Source: Pham (2016: 25). 
Considering deposits in foreign currency, there are significant modifications to reserve 
requirement ration in three periods 1997-1999, 2000-2001, 2002-2003 and 2007-2009. 
Adjustments to the ratio of deposits in foreign currency in 1997-1999, and 2007-2009 are 
corresponding to those of deposits in VND in 1998-2000, and 2007-2009. The purpose 
of these changes is similar and mentioned in the previous section. However, adjustments 
occurred in 2001-2002 are more aggressive and exceptional that those in the other two 
periods. From the end of 2000 to mid-2001, the ratio increased from 4% to 15%, and this 
policy was implemented to counter the undesirable effect of dollarization in the economy 
by stimulating the convert from USD to VND (Asian Development Bank, 2001). The ratio 
then reduced to 4% after the policy was effective, but increased to 8% in 2004 and 
remained constant afterward. This increase was intended to curb the rising inflation but 
could not produce the desirable effect (Camen, 2006). 
2.2.4.2. Interest rate 
There are two kinds of instruments, which SBV uses to control the money market. The 
first one is the base rate, and the second is the discount and refinancing policy.  
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- Base rate: 
Table 1: The liberalization of interest rate in Vietnam in 1992-2012 
Date Changes 
Before 6/1992 Specified interest rate 
6/1992 - 1995 Announce the mechanism of positive interest rate, and manage 
through floor and ceiling rates 
1996 - 6/2002 Remove ceiling rate; introduce the mechanism of base rates, and 
allow for deviations within specified bands 
6/2002 - 5/2008 Allow for negotiable lending rates 
5/2008 - 2/2010 Introduce ceiling rate again 
2/2010 - 4/2010 Determine the base rate for short term, and allow for negotiable 
interest rate for mid and long term loans. 
4/2010 - now Implement completely negotiable interest rate 
Source: To et al. (2012) 
Before 1992, SBV kept the lending and deposit interest rate under strict control. However, 
SBV has gradually liberalized the interest rate and moved towards a more flexible and 
indirect approach since 1992 as illustrated in the table above.  
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Figure 4: Lending and deposit interest rate in Vietnam in 1992-2015 
 
Source: World Bank (2017) 
The figure above represents movements of interest rate from 1996 to 2015. There are 
two periods with remarkable changes in both deposit and lending interest rates, which 
are 2007-2009, and 2009-2012. For the movements in 2007-2009, due WTO’s accession 
in 2007, there was a massive credit expansion, and to counter the effect of this expansion, 
SBV introduced again a ceiling rate but removed it immediately after the money market 
was already stabilized. After Financial Crisis 2007, together with other stimuli, SBV 
reduced the interest rate and attempted to inject liquidity into the economy. From 2009 to 
2011, the economy recovered from the crisis, but inflation also increased dramatically and 
reached a peak of 18.67% in 2011. SBV responded to this rise by setting a cap rate on 
deposit activities of 14% and brought down the base rate to less than 10% by the end of 
2012 (Nguyen, 2014 and Pham, 2016). 
- Discount and refinancing policy:  
This is the indirect instruments of SBV to influence the interest rate on the market and 
was introduced in 2000. The discount facility provides short-term loans and payment 
facilities, namely mortgaged loans and discounting valuable papers (bonds, fund 
certificates, promissory note, debentures), for credit institutions. Refinancing facility can 
0
5
10
15
20
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Deposit interest rate (%) Lending interest rate (%)
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be applied to a larger range of loans and payment facilities with higher value but riskier. 
There is a quota for discount facility, and both facilities demand collateral (Le and Pfau, 
2009; Pham, 2016). 
2.2.4.3. Open market operation 
SBV began to use open market operation in 2000, and types of securities, the number of 
financial institutions involving and open market operation sessions has increased 
substantially since then. Moreover, this tool has become more important for SBV so order 
to inject liquidity into the financial system as it contributed to 80% of total liquidity of SBV 
in 2008 (Pham, 2016). 
2.2.4.4. Exchange rate  
Before 1999, SBV determined and followed an official scheme to manage the exchange 
rate. Starting on 1996, SBV switched to a more flexible approach as it first allowed for an 
exchange rate band of 1%. There were significant adjustments to the exchange rate in 
1997-1998 because VND was overvalued due to the Asian Financial Crisis 1997. The 
band increased to 5% in February 1997, and to 10% in October 1997. Moreover, there 
were two devaluations of VND relatively to USD in 1998 with a total decrease of 16.3% 
of VND. The band stayed at 7% after the crisis. 
From 1999, SBV erased the official scheme and manage exchange rate through interbank 
markets only (Kovsted et al., 2003). SBV announced the official exchange rate based on 
the average VND/USD exchange rate of the previous day on interbank markets. Banks 
can determine their exchange rates from this official rate and the inter-bank trading band 
of SBV. Moreover, SBV has announced a plan for a convertible VND in 2010 to reduce 
the effect of dollarization (Nguyen and Nguyen, 2010). 
SBV relaxed its regulations for foreign exchange market in 2003. Furthermore, in 2005, 
the government agreed not to place any restrictions on foreign currency transactions 
under International Monetary Fund (IMF) Article VII, and make any currency arrangement 
without the acceptance of IMF (IMF, 2006). However, according to Nguyen (2014), foreign 
exchange management is still inefficient with the presence of dollarization in the economy.  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section will present previous researches about monetary policy in Vietnam and 
related issues. The literature review starts first with a summary of the theory about 
monetary transmission mechanism and possible influences of external factors on 
domestic variables. Next, a brief reflection on studies about monetary policy in Vietnam 
will be conducted. Finally, studies about inflation in other Asian countries and Vietnam 
will be examined. The rationale behind this examination is due to the fact that monetary 
policy is suggested widely in literature to control inflation (Bernanke et al., 2001). 
3.1. The cause of inflation 
3.1.1. Effects of monetary policy 
Monetary and fiscal policy are nowadays widely used to tackle problems in an economy 
in the short term to bring the economy back to its natural stage, and most countries when 
using monetary policy aim for price stability (Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002). 
Moreover, the effect of monetary policy through different mechanisms of transmission will 
ultimately reflect in aggregate output and prices (Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002; 
Nguyen, 2014). Therefore, to evaluate a certain monetary policy, researchers usually 
investigate the relationship between inflation, output and macroeconomic proxies of the 
policy’s effect on the money and asset markets. As a result, studying the interaction 
among inflation and these variables in the economy of Vietnam can help to understand 
the effectiveness of monetary policy in Vietnam, and discover the main determinants of 
inflation in order to provide appropriate suggestions for policy-makers. The following 
section will discuss four channels for monetary transmission mechanism and their 
relevance to inflation in a small open economy such as Vietnam. 
3.1.1.1. The interest rate channel 
When governments adopt a contractionary monetary policy, the central banks will 
increase interest rate. This rise in the nominal interest rate can result in an increase in 
real interest rate as expectations of price and price are likely to remain unchanged in the 
short run, or a decrease in money supply will make real interest rate increase, and this 
increase of real interest rate leads to a reduction in consumption and investment. In other 
words, keeping money in banks would give more earnings, and since the cost of 
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investment rises, firms are less likely to borrow from banks. The contraction in 
consumption and investment will cause aggregate demand to fall. A decrease in 
investment and aggregate demand signals a decrease in output. This fall discourages the 
demand for labor and is likely to increase unemployment, which will be followed by a fall 
in inflation, or deflation as the Phillips Curve depicts (Frisch, 1983; Loayza and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2002; and Nguyen, 2014). 
According to Taylor (1995), interest rate channel is the major channel for transferring the 
effect of monetary policy to behaviors of agents in the economy. This view is consistent 
with that of Keynesian and New Keynesian economists (Clarida et al., 2000). Empirical 
studies in many countries provide statistical support for this claim, for example, Cagliarini 
and Debelle (2000), Leiderman and Bar-Or (2000), and Claus (2011).  
3.1.1.2. The credit channel 
Mishkin (1995) categorizes the credit channel into two smaller channels, which are the 
bank-lending channel and the balance-sheet channel.  
In the bank-lending channel, the mechanism operates as follows. A contractionary policy 
creates a shortage of money in the economy, and thus causes a reduction in banks 
deposits. This situation can make it difficult for firms to borrow, and lower the number of 
bank loans. Because fewer firms can borrow money and finance their activities, 
investment in the economy will be likely to decrease. As a result, output possibly falls and 
leads to a decline in demand for labor, which increases unemployment and decreases 
inflation. This channel can be crucial to developing countries where the financial market 
is underdeveloped, and banks are major intermediate agents between borrowers and 
lenders (Mishkin, 1995).  
According to Mishkin (1995), the second channel functions based on the net worth of 
firms. A money shortage with higher interest rate can cause equity prices and the value 
of financial assets to fall, and increase the cost of capital. As a result, adverse selection 
and moral hazard can occur and increase in the market. More precisely, firms or 
borrowers would have an inclination to suppress information about this decrease in net 
worth and make it more difficult for lenders to obtain information about the real value of 
the particular collateral. This imbalance of possessed information is called adverse 
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selection. Moral hazard happens because a reduction in the value of company drives 
managers to undertake riskier projects with the higher rate of return while providing 
misleading information about the actual risk, and consequently, investors, lenders, and 
customers have to bear more risks of this certain decision. This situation results in a 
reduction of reliability and leads to a shrinkage in borrowing-lending activities. Therefore, 
investment can reduce and make output fall. As aforementioned, the ultimate outcome of 
this recession is a decrease in inflation. 
Studies in developing countries such as Kubo (2008) about Thailand and Sharifi-Renani 
(2010) about Iran confirm the major role of credit channel in transmitting the effect of 
monetary policy to the economy.  
3.1.1.3. The exchange rate channel 
Exchange rate channel is relevant to countries engaging in international trade. As Mishkin 
(2006) claims, an appreciation will make the domestic currency relatively more expensive 
than the foreign ones, and in turn, make the price of domestic to foreign goods rises. 
Therefore, net export and output will conceivably decrease, and thus, decrease inflation. 
Furthermore, the reduction in prices of imported goods also contributes to the reduction 
of inflation.  
However, it is worthy to note that exchange rate in Vietnam is largely controlled by the 
State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) and pegged against eight currencies of trading partners 
(SBV, 2017). Prior to 2007, although there are some depreciations of the dong in 
response to the market condition and USD value, SBV only allowed for a small fluctuation 
of the exchange rate with the band of less than ten percent VND/USD. After WTO 
accession SBV affects exchange rate through inter-bank markets only and seems to 
gradually move towards a more flexible policy for exchange rate as noted before (Pham, 
2016). Nevertheless, given the dollarization of Vietnamese economy (Goujon, 2006 & 
Pham, 2016), the effect of a fixed exchange rate regime is still relevant and valuable to 
take into consideration when evaluating the exchange rate channel. As stated by 
Blanchard and Sheen (2013), the effect of a fixed regime is transitory and dwindles in the 
long term. 
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3.1.1.4. The asset-pricing channel 
This channel is mainly developed from Tobin’s q theory (1969), which is based on how 
monetary policy might affect the valuation of companies in the economy. A decrease in 
money supply and an increase in interest rate can cause stock prices to fall. This situation 
limits the ability of firms to finance its activities as the cost of capital increases due to rise 
in interest rate and rise in the cost of equity from issuing stocks. Consequently, a reduction 
in investment is likely to occur and cause output to fall, which in turn leads to a decrease 
in inflation. In addition, according to Mishkin (1995), another influence of the asset pricing 
channel on behaviors of agents within the economy is through the effect on the wealth of 
consumers when asset prices decrease. As claimed by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), 
Ando and Modigliani (1963), and Friedman (1957), a possible reduction in lifetime wealth 
will discourage spending and lower consumption. Following the previous logic, this 
circumstance lowers output and creates a drop in inflation.  
Along with the maturity of capital markets, especially equity markets, in emerging 
economies, this channel is gaining more importance in transferring the effect of monetary 
policy, and this statement is fostered by empirical studies in developing countries, namely 
that of Pong and Wong (2011). However, in the context of Vietnam, this channel will be 
discussed in depth in the last section of this literature review.  
3.1.2. Effects of external factors 
As discussed in studies of Nguyen et al (2012), and Nguyen (2014), rice and oil prices 
can act as two major proxies to reflect the influence of external factors on inflation in 
Vietnam. According to Goujon, because rice is a major commodity item and an exportable 
good in Vietnam, an increase in export rice can create a shift in domestic supply and lead 
also to an increase in domestic rice price. This increase in domestic rice price might lead 
to an increase in price level.  While Vietnam is one of the largest rice exporters, as a small 
and open economy, it is a price-taker in the global market (2006). Therefore, one can 
expect to see some impact of world rice price on inflation in Vietnam. Furthermore, crude 
oil constitutes a remarkable proportion of Vietnam’s export, but Vietnam has imported a 
large quantity of final goods of oil for domestic consumption, and money from exporting 
oil has been used to repay foreign debts (Pham, 2016). It is reasonable to assume that 
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policy makers in Vietnam should be aware of the fluctuation of oil price and adjust its 
monetary policy accordingly to maintain price stability in the economy.  
3.2. Studies about monetary policy in Vietnam 
Most studies about monetary policy in Vietnam only deal with a specific aspect, namely 
exchange rate, inflation, and real money demand. Because this study places a significant 
part on analyzing the effect of macroeconomic variables on inflation, studies about 
inflation in Vietnam will be investigated in a separate part. Therefore, this section only 
includes studies on exchange rate and real money demand. 
In general, studies about exchange rate in Vietnam have expressed disagreements with 
the regime adopted by policy marker now in Vietnam. After investigating the current 
exchange rate regime, Mai (2007) suggests that the current macroeconomic conditions 
in Vietnam are appropriate for changing to a floating regime, and a proposal to gradually 
changing from the current regime to a floating one. Nguyen and Nguyen (2009) claim that 
the exchange rate regime in Vietnam has led to the failure of foreign exchange rate market. 
However, some studies find that the exchange rate regime that SBV follows is effective 
in dealing with some problems. For instance, according to Vuong and Ngo (2002), the 
exchange rate system in Asian Crisis in 1997 had helped to prevent a significant 
appreciation of the domestic currency, which can result from the devaluation of other 
currency in the area. Moreover, in the 1990s, the government succeeded in controlling 
inflation by using effectively the exchange rate and a restrictive monetary policy. 
Moreover, some studies about the real effective exchange rate of Vietnam also make 
some recommendations for a better monetary policy. Nguyen and Kalirajan (2006) 
support for devaluations can help with exports, account balance and weaken the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Menon (2009) recommended that the policy 
makers should modify the real exchange rate corresponding to the increase in capital 
inflow.  
Researches about real money demand in Vietnam focus on studying its drivers. Empirical 
results show that in 1993-2004, income, interest rate, inflation, and rate of return of USD 
deposits decided the demand for VND (Shinichi and Pham, 2005). There existed a 
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positive relationship between inflation and the growth rate of broad money, and the 
disequilibrium between money supply and demand of VND seemed to take approximately 
15 quarters to disappear. Another study by Nguyen and Wade (2010) using data from 
1999 to 2000 also confirm the role of income in determining the real money demand for 
domestic currency. Moreover, there is evidence of dollarization in the economy and the 
impact of inflation on real money demand. Nevertheless, there is insufficient statistically 
evidence for an impact of interest rate, and this phenomenon might indicate that the 
ineffectiveness of interest rate policy during this period (Nguyen and Wade, 2010).  
In conclusion, the incomprehensiveness of above studies about inflation in Vietnam 
makes it difficult to constructs insightful recommendations for monetary policy in Vietnam. 
Moreover, due to the rapid changes in the world economy recently, an updated study 
might be necessary.  
3.3. Empirical studies of inflation in other Asian countries 
This section will examine studies about inflation in some countries in Asia. The scope of 
discussion will be limited to these following countries and regions: Malaysia, China, 
Singapore and Hong Kong. Although inflation in these countries is considerably different 
from that in Vietnam (WB, 2017), examining studies on inflation of these countries can 
provide some insights for the research on Vietnam’s. Malaysia represents a newly 
industrialized emerging economy, which was transformed from an agricultural and mining 
economy in ASEAN (Drabble, 2001). China is the major trading partner of Vietnam for 
both import and export (WITS, 2015). Singapore is also a member of ASEAN and has an 
exchange rate regime similar to that of Vietnam as both countries follow a stabilized 
arrangement (IMF, 2016). Finally, Hong Kong is one of the main exporting markets of 
Vietnam (WITS, 2015) and the two both have an economically and politically strong link 
with China. 
For Malaysia, inflation has reacted to movements of domestic variables as described 
below. Zaidi and Fisher (2010) claim that a shock in interest rate will cause inflation to fall, 
but the effect is temporary, lasts for approximately eight quarters, and disappears in the 
long run. A study by Jongwanich and Park (2009) provides empirical support for a 
declining and limited impact of exchange rate on inflation as the time horizon increases. 
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This phenomenon is supported by Zaidi and Fisher’s research since an appreciation 
makes inflation decrease immediately, but after six quarters, inflation will revert to the 
initial level (2010). The effect of output gap upon inflation enlarges over time on 1999-
2008 (Jongwanich and Park, 2009). However, in a study conducted by Zaidi and Fisher 
(2010), the reaction of inflation to an increase in output is inconsiderable and temporary. 
Moreover, inflation responses positively to a shock to interest rate and stock prices, but 
this reaction maintains only in the short term, and these two variables overall explain only 
a little part of the inflation variance (Zaidi and Fisher, 2010).   
Nevertheless, inflation in Malaysia rises more strongly in response to external shocks 
than to internal ones. Analyzing data from 1999 to 2008, Jongwanich and Park (2009) 
state that foreign proxies contribute more to the variation of inflation than domestic ones 
do, and the impact of foreign factors amplifies over time. This finding is similar to that of 
Zaidi and Fisher (2010). 
In China, according to Jongwanich and Park (2009), foreign factors have a remarkable 
contribution to inflation variance, but this contribution is comparatively small to that of 
domestic factors, and among domestic variables, exchange rate exerts the most 
insignificant impact on inflation while output gap and expectation are two major 
explanatory proxies. Furthermore, a study about relationship between inflation and money 
supply finds no supporting evidence for a causality of these two variables during 1994-
2014, which can be attributed to the possible structural changes that appeared in this 
period (Su et al, 2016). To obtain a more comprehensive picture, these researchers 
construct tests on sub-samples and find a bilateral causal relationship between inflation 
and money supply, but the effect on each period varies (Su et al, 2016). Moreover, 
findings in study by Zhang and Clovis (2011) suggest that inflation in China has become 
less responsive to structural innovations and observed a reduction in inflation persistence. 
This improvement is attributed to better monetary policy (Zhang and Clovis, 2011). 
For Singapore, similar to China, external factors account for inflation variance less than 
internal factors do, and among all the variables, the effect of expectation is largest; those 
of oil price and output gap are relatively identical and considerable, while others are 
negligible during 1999-2008 (Jongwanich and Park, 2009). Estimating over a longer time 
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horizon 1984-1999, Cheung and Yuen (2002) find that in the first six years, internal factors 
have more impact on inflation variance than external factors, represented by US shocks, 
do. However, external factors gain more weight in explaining for variation of inflation over 
time (Cheung and Yuen, 2002). 
Finally, in the context of Hong Kong and its fixed exchange rate regime, which is pegged 
against US dollar, one could expect to observe an enormous reaction of inflation against 
shocks in USD. Accordingly, the study by Cheung and Yen (2002) confirms this statement 
since the effect of foreign shocks becomes larger than that of domestic only after three 
and a half years, and the magnitude of this effect is remarkably greater than that in 
Singapore. 
In general, the determinants of inflation in those aforementioned countries vary. It appears 
that exchange rate only has a limited impact on inflation, and external factors seem to 
have a significant contribution to inflation. However, the analyses of these countries 
provide some interesting suggestions for policy-makers in Vietnam. For instance, the 
success of monetary policy to reduce inflation and inflation persistence in China offers a 
good recommendation, or in the case of Singapore, despite some basic differences, 
policy makers in Vietnam could infer some implications due to the similarity of exchange 
rate regime, a stabilized arrangement.  
3.4. Empirical studies of inflation and monetary policy in Vietnam 
Researches about inflation in Vietnam usually focus on finding and evaluating the impact 
of several variables. The chosen proxies are usually M2, credit to the economy, interest 
rate, nominal exchange rate, and the commodities price represented by oil and rice prices. 
By analyzing data and estimating the relationships between these variables and inflation, 
researchers are able to deduce some implications about the effectiveness of and 
suggestions for monetary policy in Vietnam. However, these studies provide different and 
even conflicting results about the drivers of inflation in Vietnam.  
Firstly, the impact of monetary and credit aggregates on inflation in Vietnam is 
inconclusive. Some researches show that inflation is largely explained by credit to the 
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economy, but the impact of money supply, M2, on inflation is insignificant. In fact, other 
researches indicate that money supply could be the main source of inflation in Vietnam.  
Using data from 1999 to 2013, Bhattacharya (2014) claims that growth in credit to the 
economy has a positive impact on inflation after two to ten quarters- a medium period, 
but gives no conclusion about the relation of money supply, represented by M2, and 
inflation in Vietnam. In accordance with the previous result, using quarterly data from 
1996-2005, there is no statistical evidence that money supply measured by M2 causes 
inflation (Le & Pfau, 2009). Similarly, the results of the analysis on 1996-2005 and 1996- 
2004 show that credit to the economy has a remarkable impact on CPI, at the two-year 
horizon, or to be more specific, 25 percent of the variance of the inflation index can be 
explained by this variable. However, the estimation over the period from 1996-2003 
produces a contradictory outcome as credit only explains a small part of the variance, 
and across three samples, the variable M2 has an inconsiderable contribution to inflation 
(Camen, 2006). Consistently, from 1995 to 2003, empirical results suggest that broad 
money growth can only explain approximately ten percent of the headline inflation, and 
the effect dwindles after approximately six quarters (IMF, 2003).  
However, a research conducted by IMF (2006) covering 2001-2006 proves that the M2 
money supply has a significant influence on the CPI, the chosen indicator of inflation, in 
Vietnam. Correspondingly, the effect of monetary policy measured by M2 is the source of 
inflation during 2000-2010 (Nguyen and Nguyen, 2010). As Nguyen (2014) proves, 
although, in the short term, money supply appears to have no remarkable relationship 
with inflation, the effect of money supply increases dramatically in the medium and long 
term.  
The impact of credit to the economy on inflation is relatively considerable overestimated 
periods except for period 1996-2003. Although the effect of money supply represented by 
M2 varies with chosen periods, by comparing those chosen periods, it is likely that the 
estimation over the periods involving years before 2000 results in an insignificant impact 
while that over period after 2000 gives a contradictory outcome. 
Secondly, considering the nominal effective exchange rate, estimations of the impact on 
inflation are also substantially different. The analysis of inflation from 1999 to 2013 
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conducted by Bhattacharya (2014) indicates that the movement of exchange rate largely 
explains the dynamics of inflation in the short term. Consistent with this finding, the 
exchange rate- VND/USD contributes significantly to inflation as it accounts for nearly 19% 
of error variance, and this result is considerably robust across all three samples: 1996-
2005, 1996-2004, 1996-2003 (Camen, 2006). Furthermore, in the analysis of period 
1991-1996, Goujon (2006) claims that the exchange rate is the main inflation determinant.  
However, the nominal effective exchange rate has a modest impact on inflation during 
2001-2006, and this is partly due to administered prices, as the government imposed 
restrictions on the domestic price of commodities to hedge against the volatility of world 
price, and the stability of exchange rate during that period (IMF, 2006). Evidence from a 
previous study on inflation from 1995-2003 by IMF (2003) also confirms that the impact 
of exchange rate on inflation is middling, especially on consumer prices in contrast to a 
significant influence on import prices. The exchange rate also exerts a moderate impact 
on inflation as one percent depreciation leads to 0.16 percent of inflation during 2000-
2010 (Nguyen and Nguyen, 2010).  
In a recent research covering 2000-2011, Elgammal & Eissa (2016) argue that exchange 
rate statistically contributes to inflation at 5% confidence level. Estimating over period – 
2001 to 2009, Nguyen et al. (2012) prove that the effect of exchange rate is insignificant. 
Results from the study over 1999-2008 also yield a resembling conclusion as exchange 
rate accounts for less than 10% iof inflation variance in Vietnam (Jongwanich & Park, 
2009). During 2000-2011, exchange rate appears to exert limited influence on variation 
of inflation, and this effect decreases as the time horizon increases (Nguyen, 2014). 
It appears that no conclusion about the impact of exchange rate can be reached due to 
the considerable difference in estimated results, even those of similar periods, namely 
those of 2000-2010 by Nguyen and Nguyen (2010) and 2000-2011 by Nguyen (2014). 
This discrepancy can be the consequences of various models and methods that these 
authors choose and/or changes in exchange rate policy.   
To obtain a comprehensive depiction of the relationship between inflation and exchange 
rate, some researchers find statistical evidence that inflation in Vietnam can account for 
the movements of exchange rate before 2007. Inflation appears to moderately Granger 
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cause the exchange rate depreciation from 1993-1998 (Nguyen & Kalirajan, 2005). 
Consistently, the real exchange rate can be explained by lags of price level when 
conducting the test for all three samples: 1992-2005, 1992-1999, 1999-2005, and price 
level accounts for 65 to 70% of the real exchange rate variance from 1992-2005 (Nguyen 
& Fujita, 2007). Unfortunately, there are few researches examining the impact of inflation 
on the exchange rate after 2007. This relation is worth studying especially when 
increasing capital inflows after Vietnam’s WTO accession in 2007 and the tendency to 
move toward a flexible regime of SBV can limit the ability to use exchange rate as an 
operation to maintain price stability and economic growth as implied by Pham (2016). 
Most researches have demonstrated that the impact of interest rate on inflation is 
uncertain. In a study by Camen (2006), interest rate accounts for a negligible amount of 
inflation variance, which is less than five percent in all three samples. The analysis of data 
from 2001 to 2009 also provides empirical support for an inconsiderable contribution of 
interest rate to inflation variance (Nguyen. et al, 2012). However, an empirical analysis 
using data from the recent period, 1996-2012, proves that interest rate is an important 
contributor to the variation of inflation (Phan, 2014), and this result is consistent with the 
study covering 2000-2011 of Nguyen (2014). Moreover, interest rate affects inflation 
significantly in the first two quarters during 1996-2013 (Bhattacharya, 2014). A distinction 
between ante-2008 studies and post-2008 studies is likely to suggest that interest rate 
channel might be enhanced to become an important instrument of monetary policy to 
control inflation. 
Besides those prominent internal factors, some researchers also mention the relationship 
between the proxy for asset pricing channel for monetary transmission mechanism and 
inflation. Le and Pfau (2009) argue that because the stock exchanges in Vietnam are only 
founded in 2000 and relatively limited in size with few players and openness, this channel 
is irrelevant to the study. Furthermore, findings from a study by Nguyen (2014) show little 
support for such a relationship as the stock index accounts for approximately five percent 
of inflation variance. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to include this channel when 
the stock exchanges, or in general the financial market are still immature. 
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Regarding how external factors influence inflation in Vietnam, there exists a considerable 
gap between the impact of oil and rice price, and studies seem to agree that while the 
effect of rice price on inflation is statistically significant, oil price exerts only a negligible 
impact. For instance, analyzing data from 1999-2008, Jongwanich & Park (2009) claim 
that the main driver of inflation is food price as it explains over 30% of the inflation 
variance, while less than 10% of variance can be explained by movement of oil price. For 
period 1996-2012, the impact of rice price on inflation among other external factors is the 
most significant one, but that of oil price is unnoticeable (Phan, 2014). As IMF (2003) 
states, a large portion of inflation variance is attributed to rice price as compared to the 
effect of oil price on movement of inflation during 1995-2003. Consistently, studies over 
periods 2000-2011 find no statistical support for a relationship between inflation and oil 
price (Nguyen & Nguyen, 2010; Elgammal & Eissa, 2016). However, during 1996-2005, 
the impact of oil and rice price on inflation varied enormously across estimated models 
and periods, but overall, the combined effect accounts for at least 30% of variation 
(Camen, 2006), and this result is similar to that of Nguyen (2012) and Nguyen (2014). 
From previous studies, the impact of external factors is comparatively strong, and this 
finding suggests policy makers might consider adopting a policy to mitigate this impact. 
As recommended by Nguyen & Nguyen (2010), a more flexible exchange rate regime 
would help to counter the effect of foreign factors, and Bhattacharya (2014) suggests a 
liberalization of interest rate is likely to be more efficient to maintain price stability as well 
as reducing the impact of foreign factors.  
To conclude, from preceding researches, the determinants of inflation in Vietnam can be 
external factors, interest rate for researches conducted on post-2008 periods, and money 
supply for studies after the year 2000. These results suggest that there might be an 
increase in the effectiveness of monetary policy as two major monetary transmission 
channels namely the interest rate and credit channels seems to gain more importance in 
transferring the effect to the economy. Moreover, the decisive role of foreign variables in 
influencing movement of inflation implies that policy-makers should be vigilant against 
these factors to make an appropriate adjustment to lean against their negative effects. 
However, there is an inconsistency in results of different estimated periods, and this 
phenomenon might indicate that the government has adopted a monetary policy to 
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accommodate changes in Vietnamese economy across years. Therefore, an updating 
analysis is of vital importance to reflect the impact of monetary policy in the recent period. 
3.5. Conceptual framework. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbe (2002). 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1. A discussion of VAR, SVAR models and VECM 
In the context of Vietnam, with a relatively limited data, approaches without the 
requirement for good-quality data are the most appropriate. These include vector 
autoregressive (VAR), vector error correction model (VECM), and structural vector 
autoregressive (SVAR). 
VAR approach has been widely used to evaluate the effects of monetary policy, especially 
through monetary transmission mechanisms, starting after the work of Sims on 1980. 
VAR method allows for a comprehensive examination of dynamic relationships among 
variables with a surprising simplicity (Asterious and Hall, 2011). Moreover, with a lack of 
consensus on the structural model of the economy, VAR model seems to provide 
approximately good estimations of the effects of monetary policy (Rudebusch, 1998). 
However, this method has some critical drawbacks such as the difficulty to reach any 
conclusions from a large number of estimated coefficient and to infer the economic 
implication of estimated parameters (Pham, 2016). 
VECM accounts for both short run and long run effects, can eliminate trends existing in 
variables, and corrects errors of the regression in the long run (Asterious and Hall, 2011). 
However, one major disadvantage of this method is that it assumes all shocks are 
permanent, so the effects of temporary shocks can be misspecified (Nguyen, 2014). 
SVAR is a development of VAR, which aims to remove the disadvantages in VAR 
approach (Pham, 2016). In SVAR, before estimating, certain assumptions about 
relationships between variables based on economic theory is added to provide better 
results from estimations, and it helps to provide some inferences for parameters of 
models and describe precisely whether a particular shock is permanent or temporary 
(Nguyen, 2014 and Pham, 2016). 
4.2. Structural VAR for a small open economy 
Based on the discussion above, for this study, an SVAR approach is adopted to examine 
the relationships between chosen macroeconomics variables relating to monetary policy. 
SVAR models are constructed using results from researches of Kim and Roubini (2000), 
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Nguyen (2014), and Pham (2016) to describe the effects of monetary policy through 
channels of monetary transmission mechanism.  
4.3. Introduction of structural VAR models 
The structural form of an SVAR model is: 
𝐴0𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑌𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝑃𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡 (1) 
Where:  𝑌𝑡 is a (𝑛 × 1) vector of endogenous variables. 
 𝑌𝑡−𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑝) is a (𝑛 × 1) vector of i-th lag of endogenous variables 
 𝐴𝑖 (𝑖 = 0,… , 𝑝) is a (𝑛 × 𝑛) coefficient matrix of 𝑌𝑡−𝑖 
 𝜀𝑡 is a (𝑛 × 1) vector of structural innovations.  
The model assumes 𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0, Σ) and 𝐸(𝜀𝑡, 𝜀𝑡
′) = Ω, where Ω is a diagonal matrix. In other 
words, structural innovations are orthogonal and uncorrelated.  
For this model,  𝐴𝑖 and the variance of 𝜀𝑡 should be estimated, but one could not do so 
given the structural form of the SVAR model. Therefore, the model must be transformed 
into a reduced form by multiplying both sides of (1) with 𝐴0
−1: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴1𝐴0
−1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝐴0
−1𝑌𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝑃𝐴0
−1𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡 (2) 
Simplifying to obtain: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐵1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐵2𝑌𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝐵𝑃𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑢𝑡 (3) 
Where𝐴𝑖𝐴0
−1 = 𝐵𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,…𝑝),𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡 = 𝑢𝑡 and 𝐸(𝑢𝑡, 𝑢𝑡
′) = 𝐴0
−1Ω (𝐴0
−1)′ is the variance 
covariance matrix of 𝑢𝑡. The assumptions for 𝑢𝑡 are 𝐸(𝑢𝑡, 𝑢𝑠) = 0 (𝑡 ≠ 𝑠), and 𝐸[𝑢𝑡] = 0. 
Estimations of coefficient matrices 𝐵𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,…𝑝) can be used to identify the coefficient 
matrices in the structural form 𝐴𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,…𝑝). The structural innovations 𝜀𝑡 can be derived 
from errors 𝑢𝑡 of the reduced form, but certain restrictions must be placed on the system. 
In details, 
𝑛(𝑛−1)
2
 restrictions must be imposed on 𝐴0  matrix to be able to identify the 
structural shocks.  
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4.4. Puzzles 
Many empirical researches on the effects of monetary policy in both closed and open 
economies have found many abnormal responses (puzzles) of macroeconomic variables 
to monetary shocks, which cannot be explained by economic theories (Kim and Roubini, 
2000). In details, there are four typical puzzles: 
- The liquidity puzzle: A shock to money supply should appear with a decrease in 
nominal interest rate, but is found to be accompanying by an increase (Leeper and 
Gordon, 1991; Kim and Roubini, 2000). 
- The price puzzle: An increase in price should lead to a decrease in inflation, but is 
found to be followed by an increase (Sims, 1992). 
- The exchange rate puzzle: An increase in interest rate of the home country should 
lead to an appreciation of the domestic currency, but is followed by a depreciation 
(Sims, 1992). 
- The forward discount bias puzzle: If uncovered interest parity holds, a relatively 
increase in the interest rate to foreign ones should be followed by an appreciation 
and then a persistent depreciation of the domestic currency, but is accompanying 
by a persistent appreciation (Kim and Roubini, 2000). 
The puzzles usually result from the choice of variables and assumptions created in SVAR 
identification (Pham, 2016).  
For instance, price puzzle may arise from using money aggregates to represent 
adjustments in monetary policy because changes in money aggregates might also reflect 
money demand shocks (Sims, 1992). Many researchers have suggested using other 
variables instead of money aggregates such as short-term interest rate (Sims, 1992), and 
inflationary expectation (Gordon and Leeper, 1994).  
Addressing this issue, Kim and Roubini (2000) develop a non-recursive SVAR model to 
estimate the effect of monetary policy in seven countries, and find that the responses of 
macroeconomic variables to monetary shocks support the predictions of economic 
theories. Applying the SVAR model developed by Kim and Roubini (2000) to Indonesian 
economy and focusing on exchange rate channel, Afandi (2005) finds no existence of an 
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exchange rate puzzle and shows that a depreciation of domestic currency appears after 
the implementation of a contractionary monetary policy.  
4.5. Recursive and non-recursive models 
4.5.1. Recursive 
When estimating the response of variables to temporary shocks using recursive models, 
one assume that variables are affected following a sequential chain of shocks, or the 
matrix 𝐴0 is diagonal and takes the form of a lower triangular matrix as follows: 
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Specifically, the first variable is assumed to response to its own shocks. The second one 
is affected by shocks of the previous variable and its own, and so forth. When using 
recursive model, researchers make assumptions that policymakers only use the available 
information to design monetary policy (Raghavan et al., 2012).  
4.5.2. Non-recursive:  
Non-recursive models allow for more flexibility, and shocks do not need to affect all 
preceding variables. As the following model by Kim and Roubini (2000) illustrates, the 
first variable response to its own shocks, and shocks from the second, fifth, and seventh 
variables.  
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These models eliminate the strict assumptions about behaviors of policymakers that 
researchers must impose when using recursive models, and allow for a better estimation, 
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especially when it is possible for policy makers to implement a policy, which also takes 
into consideration the unexpected shocks nowadays.  
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5. DATA AND MODEL 
5.1. Variables 
Based on previous researches about monetary policy in Vietnam and researches in other 
countries, the following variables are chosen to conduct the study: 
Foreign blocks: world oil price (OIL), world rice price (RICE), U.S. Federal fund rate (FED). 
Domestic blocks: gross domestic product (GDP), consumer price index (CPI), money 
supply (M1), bank credit (CRE), short-term interest rate (PR), nominal exchange rate 
(NEER).  
Because Vietnam is a small open economy, including foreign variables to account for the 
external effect, is of vital importance: 
 In previous researches about Vietnam, namely IMF (2003), Camen (2006), 
Nguyen & Nguyen (2010), Nguyen (2014), Pham (2016), world oil price (oil) is also 
included as a key foreign factor. Moreover, this variable is widely used in 
researches about monetary policy of other small open economies with SVAR 
models, namely the studies of Kim and Roubini (2000), and Afandi (2005). 
Furthermore, crude oil is the main export product in Vietnam, and movements of 
oil price can affect prices of many products and goods. Therefore, shocks in oil 
price might have a significant impact on the implementation of monetary policy and 
domestic variables.  
 World rice price (rice) is frequently used in studies about Vietnam with world oil 
price. Although this variable does not typically appear in an SVAR model about 
monetary transmission mechanisms in small open countries, Le and Pfau (2009) 
and Nguyen (2014) argue that it is necessary to account for shocks from rice price 
to domestic variable because rice is a primary commodity and major exportable 
good in Vietnam. Moreover, as mentioned above, because Vietnam is a small 
economy in the world, it appears to be a price-taker than a price-maker, so world 
rice price should be considered as an external variable. 
 Although U.S. Federal fund rate (fed) only appears in few studies about Vietnam, 
this is a common variable in studies using SVAR approach on the effect of 
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monetary policy, namely Kim and Roubini (2000), Afandi (2005), Raghavan and 
Silvapulle (2011). Adding this variable to the SVAR model will help to describe the 
external shocks to Vietnamese economy more precisely due to the dominant role 
of US dollar in international exchange, the exchange rate regime as VND is pegged 
mainly against USD, and the possible dollarization in Vietnam (Goujon, 2006, 
Nguyen and Nguyen, 2010, and Nguyen, 2014).  
The domestic variables are chosen to represent three monetary transmission channels: 
the interest rate channel, the credit channel, and the exchange rate channel. As 
discussed in the literature review, due to the immaturity of financial markets in Vietnam, 
the asset-pricing channel is not included.  
 Real GDP and CPI accounts for the primary targets of monetary policy, which are 
economic growth and price stability in Vietnam. The use of real GDP in this study 
follows the standard practice in researches about monetary policy (Pham, 2016). 
 M1 is the variable of monetary aggregate and reflects the response of SBV to 
foreign and domestic shocks. While many studies about Vietnam use M2 as the 
proxy for monetary aggregate (Camen, 2006; Le and Pfau, 2009; Nguyen and 
Nguyen, 2010, and Bhattacharya, 2014), M1 can be a more appropriate indicator. 
As Pham (2016) argues, M2 can be influenced by other factors from financial 
markets than monetary policy as the growth of M2 is substantively larger than that 
of M1 and M0.  
 PR and CRE stand for interest rate channel and credit channel respectively.  
 NEER denotes the nominal exchange rate of VND/USD and represents the 
exchange rate channel. This variable is chosen to reflect the exchange rate channel 
because movements of USD play an important role in the decision of central bank to 
adjust the exchange rate, and USD is usually used as the intermediate currency in foreign 
trade in Vietnam (Goujon, 2006, and Ministry of Industry and Trade Vietnam, 2017).  
5.2. Data source and adjustments 
Data is collected from trustworthy sources, namely IMF, general statistics of Vietnam, the 
State Bank of Vietnam, and Ministry of Industry and Trade Vietnam.  
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Data for all variables except GDP are available in monthly frequency. GDP is only existed 
in quarterly data and recalculated with 1994 as the base year. This quarterly data of real 
GDP is then converted to monthly frequency using Denton’s method. Finally, all the 
variables are seasonally adjusted using X-12 ARIMA and in logarithm form except for 
FED and PR.  
Moreover, taken into consideration the effect of WTO accession in 2007, data is broken 
into two small samples: 1998M10-2006M12, and 2007M01-2016M10. This approach 
uses the result of test for structural break in trilemma analysis of external influences by 
Pham (2016). Conducting a similar analysis is beyond the scope of this study. Moreover, 
when looking at the residual plots (Appendix A), one can see that there is no evidence of 
the existence of structural break from 2013 to 2016 as the analysis of Pham (2016) covers 
the period 1995-2013. 
5.3. Data for an SVAR model 
For empirical studies about monetary transmission mechanisms, researchers usually use 
two different approaches to estimate an SVAR model with non-stationary data. The first 
approach is transforming non-stationary time series into stationary time series by taking 
the first or second differences of the level data (Nguyen, 2010, and Nguyen, 2014). This 
process is of vital importance to avoid obtaining spurious regression when estimating the 
model at level values when the data used for the study have unit root. Furthermore, this 
transformation will also help to increase the quality of impulse response functions and 
variance decomposition (Nguyen, 2014).  
However, taking the differences is criticized for leading to a loss of information, and to 
account for long-term relationships, it is better to use the level data (Sims, 1992, and Kim 
and Roubini, 2000). This approach can allow for a better analysis of the dynamic 
relationships between variables, and one can mitigate the effects of non-stationary data 
by adding more lags to the model. Nevertheless, other researchers show that the problem 
of spurious regression still exists in this approach (Berkelmans, 2005, and Aslanidi, 2007).  
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Because this study focuses on examining the relationships in short-term and medium-
term, the first approach will be adopted. Unit root test using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test will be used to identify whether a variable is stationary.  
5.4. Model identification 
To set up the SVAR model used in this study, Granger Causality test will be applied to 
test for possible linkages between macroeconomic variables in three monetary 
transmission channels: 
- The interest rate channel with 4 variables: PR, GDP, CPI, and M1 
- The credit channel with 4 variables: GDP, CPI, M1, and CRE 
- The exchange rate channel with 5 variables: GDP, CPI, NEER, M1, and EXIM. 
This process follows one used by Pham (2016). EXIM is the ratio of total exported value 
over total imported value of goods each month. Results of these Granger Causality tests 
are reported in Appendix B.   
Moreover, several SVAR models by Kim and Roubini (2000), Nguyen (2014), and Pham 
(2016) are used as benchmark models to construct the SVAR model of this study. 
The SVAR model: 
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The contemporaneous matrix (A): 
 OIL RICE FED GDP CPI M1 PR CRE NEER 
OIL 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RICE 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FED NA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GDP NA NA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
CPI NA NA 0 NA 1 0 0 0 0 
M1 0 0 0 NA NA 1 NA 0 0 
PR 0 0 NA NA NA 0 1 0 0 
CRE 0 0 0 0 NA NA NA 1 NA 
NEER NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 1 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
6.1. Unit root test 
Variable  Level First difference 
AIC p-value Stationary AIC p-value Stationary 
FED -4.1814 0.0055 Yes N/A N/A N/A 
PR -2.5254 0.0115 Yes N/A N/A N/A 
CPI 3.1880 0.9997 No -4.5682 0.0002 No 
CRE 0.8540 0.8939 No -23.9599 0.0000 No 
GDP 4.7000 1.0000 No -5.5089 0.0000 No 
M1 4.1923 1.0000 No -6.8016 0.0000 No 
NEER 4.5551 1.0000 No -17.0265 0.0000 No 
OIL -1.4349 0.8486 No -12.7621 0.0000 No 
RICE -1.8413 0.6817 No -6.8847 0.0000 No 
 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test shows that except for federal fund rate (FED) and 
policy rate (PR), all other time series have unit root at the level, and this result implicates 
that these variables should be differencing before used to estimate the models. Moreover, 
when testing at first difference, the null hypothesis that unit root exists can all be rejected 
at five percent significance level, so these first differencing time series can be applied for 
the SVAR models. 
6.2. Lag-length criteria & Johansen’s co-integration tests results 
Table 2: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Sample: 1998M11 2016M10 
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  4778.821 NA   3.97e-32 -46.76295 -46.61656 -46.70373 
1  5834.203  2007.295  2.82e-36 -56.31571 -54.85184 -55.72355 
2  6052.035  395.0889  7.41e-37 -57.65721  -54.87584*  -56.53210* 
3  6125.299  126.4155  8.08e-37 -57.58136 -53.48251 -55.92330 
4  6188.857  104.0614  9.79e-37 -57.41037 -51.99402 -55.21936 
5  6315.079  195.5197   6.50e-37* -57.85372 -51.11988 -55.12976 
6  6380.654  95.79086  7.97e-37 -57.70249 -49.65117 -54.44558 
7  6459.908  108.7794  8.73e-37 -57.68537 -48.31656 -53.89551 
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8  6550.938  116.9111  8.75e-37 -57.78370 -47.09740 -53.46090 
9  6617.598  79.73053  1.15e-36 -57.64311 -45.63933 -52.78736 
10  6699.719  90.97797  1.36e-36 -57.65411 -44.33283 -52.26541 
11  6814.873  117.4118  1.21e-36 -57.98895 -43.35019 -52.06731 
12  6926.252   103.7356*  1.20e-36  -58.28679* -42.33053 -51.83219 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 
To estimate parameters of SVAR in this study, the lag-length of the reduced form 
should be determined. Table 2 shows the results of different lag-length criteria. There 
are two criteria suggesting two lags, namely SC and HQ. Two other criteria, LR and AIC 
suggests 12 lags. Due to limited data, the most parsimonious model should be chosen 
to reduce the number of estimated parameters (Ouliaris et al., 2016). Therefore, 2 lags 
(2 months) is selected. Moreover, the eigenvalues of VAR (2) model presented in Table 
3 all lie inside the unit circle, so the VAR/SVAR models with two lags satisfy the stability 
condition and can be estimated.   
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Table 3: VAR Stability 
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial 
Endogenous variables: DLOIL DLRICE FED DLGDP 
DLCPI DLM1 PR DLCRE DLNEER  
Exogenous variables: C  
Lag specification: 1 2 
  
       Root Modulus 
  
   0.974887  0.974887 
 0.893432 - 0.055329i  0.895144 
 0.893432 + 0.055329i  0.895144 
 0.574901 + 0.617924i  0.844003 
 0.574901 - 0.617924i  0.844003 
 0.668103  0.668103 
 0.521374  0.521374 
-0.443379  0.443379 
 0.084791 + 0.420935i  0.429390 
 0.084791 - 0.420935i  0.429390 
 0.325547 + 0.220592i  0.393245 
 0.325547 - 0.220592i  0.393245 
-0.189586 - 0.315687i  0.368240 
-0.189586 + 0.315687i  0.368240 
 0.083065 + 0.257067i  0.270154 
 0.083065 - 0.257067i  0.270154 
-0.228161  0.228161 
-0.177444  0.177444 
  
   No root lies outside the unit circle. 
 VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
  
Table 4 shows the results of Johansen’s co-integration tests for variables in levels form. 
The results imply that there is co-integration at rank two. This is reasonable because co-
integration commonly exists between variables such as GDP and credit (IMF, 2017). 
Furthermore, the results of Johansen’s co-integration tests in first difference forms 
indicate that there is no evidence of co-integration (Table 5). 
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Table 4: Johansen's co-integration tests in levels form 
Sample (adjusted): 1998M12 2016M10   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LCPI LCRE LGDP LM1 LNEER LOIL LRICE PR FED   
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None   0.338502  282.1234  197.3709  0.0000 
At most 1   0.250802  193.2750  159.5297  0.0002 
At most 2   0.184410  131.1934  125.6154  0.0219 
At most 3  0.139426  87.36711  95.75366  0.1641 
At most 4  0.102018  55.08377  69.81889  0.4155 
At most 5  0.080966  31.94869  47.85613  0.6150 
At most 6  0.040420  13.79569  29.79707  0.8519 
At most 7  0.021830  4.924837  15.49471  0.8167 
At most 8  0.000834  0.179432  3.841466  0.6719 
     
      
Table 5: Johansen's co-integration tests in first difference forms 
Sample (adjusted): 1999M02 2006M12   
Included observations: 95 after adjustments  
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: DLCPI DLCRE DLGDP DLM1 DLNEER DLOIL DLRICE FED PR  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None   0.716295  439.7941  197.3709  0.0000 
At most 1   0.686424  320.1111  159.5297  0.0000 
At most 2   0.513647  209.9383  125.6154  0.0000 
At most 3   0.361683  141.4604  95.75366  0.0000 
At most 4   0.290556  98.81303  69.81889  0.0001 
At most 5   0.249249  66.20199  47.85613  0.0004 
At most 6   0.185508  38.96732  29.79707  0.0034 
At most 7   0.163728  19.47415  15.49471  0.0119 
At most 8  0.025850  2.488025  3.841466  0.1147 
     
     
 
 
6.3. Estimations of contemporaneous coefficient matrix 
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Table 6: Contemporaneous coefficient matrix for period 1998-2006 
  OIL RICE FED GDP CPI M1 PR CRE NEER 
OIL 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RICE 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FED -0.0040 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  0.0021                 
GDP -0.0020 0.0169 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  0.0026 0.0058               
CPI -0.0112 -0.0328 0.0000 0.3275 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  0.0050 0.0116   0.1952           
M1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -1.5137 -0.1903 1.0000 0.5591 0.0000 0.0000 
        1.2811 0.6359   0.5011     
PR 0.0000 0.0000 0.2412 -0.3545 0.1133 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
      0.3186 0.2578 0.1287         
CRE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3916 -0.4276 0.4974 1.0000 -0.1810 
          0.3409 0.0542 0.2668   0.1512 
NEER 0.0010 -0.0054 -2.0648 -0.5406 0.4737 0.0089 0.0317 0.0000 1.0000 
  0.0114 0.0265 0.5322 0.4430 0.2256 0.0339 0.1681     
 
Table 7: Contemporaneous coefficient matrix for period 2007-2016 
  OIL RICE FED GDP CPI M1 PR CRE NEER 
OIL 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
RICE 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
FED -0.0029 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  0.0012                 
GDP -0.0062 0.0041 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  0.0051 0.0080               
CPI -0.0169 -0.0108 0.0000 -0.0801 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  0.0048 0.0073   0.0846           
M1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.8196 0.8834 1.0000 1.1851 0.0000 0.0000 
        0.4861 0.4985   0.3741     
PR 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6103 -0.0839 -0.0445 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
      0.5124 0.1187 0.1221         
CRE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0195 -0.2663 0.1161 1.0000 -0.0905 
          0.1311 0.0238 0.1078   0.0758 
NEER 0.0012 -0.0060 -0.7145 -0.1923 -0.0680 -0.0064 -0.4615 0.0000 1.0000 
  0.0092 0.0133 0.6753 0.1548 0.1676 0.0288 0.1228     
*blue cells denote that the coefficient is significant at 5 percent significance level. 
*green cells denote that the coefficient is significant at 5 percent significance level. 
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The two matrixes illustrate some interesting points. The effects of world rice price on GDP 
and CPI became insignificant in 2007-2016. The impact of GDP on CPI was more 
noticeable in the first period than in the second. However, M1 seemed to be more 
responsive to shocks from GDP and CPI in the later period than in the preceding one. 
The impact of PR on CRE was fading in 2007-2016. Finally, NEER responded to shocks 
from FED and CPI in 1998-2006 while in 2007-2916, it only reacted to shocks from PR. 
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6.4. Response of domestic variables to shocks 
6.4.1. Responses of GDP and CPI to foreign shocks 
6.4.1.1. Responses of GDP to foreign shocks 
Figure 5: Responses of GDP to foreign shocks, 1998-2006 and 2007-2016 
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According to Figure 5, in 1998-2006, positive innovations to oil price caused a positive 
impact on GDP. The effect of oil shocks seemed to dwindle after one year and is not 
significant in the long term. An increase in output here is reasonable. Before 2007, 
Vietnam had to import the final products of oil as the first oil refinery only started to operate 
in 2010. However, the exporting value crude oil was substantively larger than importing 
value of final products. The differences were 1,432 million USD in 2000 and 2,092 million 
USD in 2006 (WITS, 2017). Therefore, an increase in oil price would increase GDP.   
In 2007-2016, responses of GDP to shocks from oil price seemed to be stronger, and the 
impact of oil price lasted for approximately two years. An increase in world oil price led to 
a positive response of GDP in the first four and half months. However, after this period, 
this increase seemed to exert a negative impact on GDP. The stronger responses of GDP 
could be explained by the WTO accession in 2007. Because Vietnamese economy was 
more open, it would become more responsive to major external shocks such as oil. 
Positive responses of GDP in the first period resulted from the revenue that Vietnam 
gained as an exporter of crude oil. Negative responses of GDP latter could be explained 
by the rising cost of production due to an increase in oil price. One should note that before 
2007, domestic petroleum price was heavily regulated by the government and stayed 
below the world price (IMF, 2006). Therefore, an increase in world oil price in 1998-2006 
would have an insignificant impact on the cost of production. Thus, one cannot see the 
negative responses of GDP latter to shocks from oil price in 1998-2006 as GDP does in 
2007-2016. 
An increase in world rice price led to a negative response of GDP, then a positive and 
negative again in 1998-2007. The effect lasted for around one and a half year. According 
to Bui and Karla (2016), the correlation between food inflation and world rice price in 
Vietnam is extremely strong. Therefore, an increase in world rice price indicated that food 
price in Vietnam could also increase, and total consumption might fall due to a decrease 
in budget and cause GDP to fall. However, because Vietnam is one of the largest 
exporters of rice, after several months, an increase in rice price would bring a positive 
impact on exported rice and lead to positive responses from GDP.  
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In 2007-2016, positive innovations from rice price led to negative responses of GDP. 
Similar to the previous period, the high correlation between food inflation and world rice 
price could be used to account for these responses. However, the effect of rice price was 
larger and longer in 1998-2006 than that in 2007-2016. This difference in two periods was 
consistent with the structural change in Vietnamese economy in the 2000s. Before 2000, 
Vietnam still focused on developing agriculture, but after 2000, the priority became the 
development of industrial and service sectors (Ministry of Industry and Trade Vietnam, 
2012). Moreover, when looking at the main exported goods of Vietnam, one can see that 
more high-value-added goods have become dominant while the percentage of the value 
of exported rice to the total exported goods decreased by years (Ministry of Industry and 
Trade Vietnam, 2017). Therefore, an increase in rice price could not affect output growth 
as it did in 1998-2006 because the increase in the value of exported price contributed 
significantly less to the value of total exported goods.  
As shown in Figure 5, shocks from Federal Fund Rate had a positive impact on GDP in 
1998-2006 but a negative impact in 2007-2016. The positive influence in the first period 
was quite understandable for a relatively close economy like Vietnam before 2007. 
Because an increase in the US interest rate benefited Vietnam’s export, output might 
increase as a result. Moreover, examining the responses of domestic interest rate to an 
increase in FED, one can see that in 1996-2006, domestic interest rate, PR, seemed to 
have no response while in 2007-2016, PR responded positively overall to the increase. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that after 2006, policymakers might need to react 
to an increase in FED by increasing domestic interest rate to avoid currency depreciation 
when the economy was more open. This increase in PR can discourage total demand 
and lead to a decrease in output. According to Kim and Roubini (2000), there is evidence 
that the effect of an increase in interest rate is bigger than the positive effect of export. 
Hence, this could also be the case for Vietnam.  
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6.4.1.2. Responses of CPI to foreign shocks 
Figure 6: Responses of CPI to foreign shocks, 1998-2006 and 2007-2016 
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For CPI, in both surveyed periods, an increase in oil price would lead to a positive 
response of CPI. The positive responses of price level to shocks from oil price were 
consistent with the predicted results of economic theories for a small economy like 
Vietnam because world oil price could affect domestic oil price in Vietnam. Moreover, the 
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magnitude and length of the impact of oil price on price level in the second period were 
significant and larger than that in the first period. This could be explained by the openness 
of Vietnamese economy. Before 2007, due to administrated prices, domestic petroleum 
price only increased nine times and remained below the world level (IMF, 2006). 
Therefore, world oil price only had a limited effect on price level before 2007.  
The responses of CPI to shocks from rice price were well behaved in both periods, as an 
increase in rice price causes a positive impact on CPI, and this effect decreased over 
time. Compared two periods, one could also observe a greater magnitude and longer 
duration of the effect in 2007-2016. The openness of Vietnamese economy might also 
account for this difference.  
In 1998-2006, an increase in FED seemed to have a negative impact on CPI, but the 
effect was negligible. One possible explanation is an increase in FED might be the 
response of Federal Reserve to a decrease in oil price, and a decrease in oil price might 
cause inflation to fall. Nevertheless, the insignificant of the impact implies that this is not 
a strong claim.  However, in 2007-2016, positive innovations from FED rate possibly led 
to a negative response of CPI. In this period, an increase in FED is likely to follow by an 
increase in domestic interest rate, PR, and as PR increase, domestic demand might fall 
and lead to a decrease in inflation.  
Generally, only the impact of world rice price on price level was significant in 1998-2006. 
While in 2007-2016, all three variables had a noticeable impact on price level. This 
illustrates the openness of Vietnamese economy and implies that policymakers should 
change their approach to control inflation after 2007.  
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6.4.2. Responses of GDP and CPI to domestic shocks 
6.4.2.1. Responses of GDP to domestic shocks 
Figure 7: Responses of GDP to domestic shocks, 1998-2006
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Figure 8: Responses of GDP to domestic shocks, 2007-2016 
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For 1998-2006, among all the responses to positive innovations from domestic shocks, 
responses of GDP to shocks from policy rate were the largest as illustrated in the figure 
above. In details, positive innovations from policy rate could create an increase in output 
level and this growth maintained for three months before declining for another five months, 
then fluctuated and completely vanished after 16 months. The first increase of output in 
response to an increase in policy rate seems to be contradictory to the predicted response 
of theoretical models, as output should decrease with an increase in interest rate. One 
possible explanation is there exists a delay from the time the policy is implemented to the 
time it actually creates an impact, and one can see that there is a decrease in output 
followed after.  
Secondly, shocks from M1 first seemed to cause a positive impact on GDP overall with a 
slightly negative response in the first two months. This phenomenon is consistent with the 
normal reaction of policy makers, as they notice a recession might happen, money would 
be injected into the economy to boost investment and consumption, and due to a delaying 
time that the policy needs to create an impact on the economy, output would decrease 
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for the first few months, and then increase after that. However, the effect was 
comparatively small and might not be significant. 
Thirdly, GDP seemed to have a positive response to shocks from CRE for five months 
and then a negative response for four months. However, the large confidence interval 
including zero gave no conclusion about the impact of CRE on GDP. Moreover, based on 
Figure 7, GDP might not respond to positive innovations of NEER.  
In the second period, GDP appeared to be more responsive to shocks from M1, CRE, 
and NEER while the magnitude and length of impact of PR remained unchanged.  
Overall, positive innovations of PR, led to a decrease in GDP as predicted by economic 
theories when an increase in interest rate reduce total demand and lead to a fall in output. 
However, this impact might be temporary and disappear after one year.  
Shocks from M1 might create a positive impact on GDP for four months then a negative 
one for five months, and continued to exert fluctuated impacts. However, as shown in 
Figure 8, the impact might not be noticeable. 
Considering the impact of NEER on GDP, it is likely that GDP responded positively to 
shocks from NEER. In other words, a devaluation of VND in 2007-2016 can have a 
positive impact on GDP. However, similar to M1, the large confidence interval including 
zero over the estimated time implies an insignificant influence of NEER.  
Finally, due to the large confidence interval of all domestic variables, one cannot reject 
the hypothesis that GDP has no response to these variables and cannot infer a significant 
impact of the domestic variable on GDP. 
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6.4.2.2. Responses of CPI to domestic shocks  
Figure 9: Responses of CPI to domestic shocks, 1998-2006
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Figure 10: Responses of CPI to domestic shocks, 2007-2016
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In 1998-2006, the responses of CPI to shocks from M1 is positive in the first month, then 
negative for the next five months, and then diminished. It is likely that an increase in M1 
creates a slight increase in inflation, but the increase would be negligible according to 
Figure 9. Positive shocks from M1 will lead to a positive response of CPI because as 
money supply increases in the short run while output is likely to remain unchanged, price 
level will increase relatively to counter the effect of excess money.  
An increase in PR might result in a decrease in inflation in this period, but the impact is 
temporary and unnoticeable. The responses of CPI follow economic theories, as the 
interest rate increases, aggregate demand falls and leads to the reduction of inflationary 
pressure.  
Shocks from CRE exerted a slightly negative impact on CPI, but the duration of the effect 
was only approximately five months. The weak response of CPI to M1 and CRE might 
suggest that credit channel was not the major instrument that SBV used to control inflation 
in this period.  
The response of CPI to positive innovations from NEER was positive and lasted for 3 
months. Particularly, a devaluation of VND led to a slightly increase in inflation. One 
possible explanation for this phenomenon is devaluations of domestic currency will result 
in more expensive imported goods, and this increase in price translate into a higher price 
level overall. Moreover, devaluations also encourage the demand for exported goods, 
and lead to an increase in output and can lead to higher inflation.  
Nevertheless, there are some changes in responses of CPI to shocks from domestic 
variables in 2007-2016. The effect of all variables become more significant.  
An increase in money supply, M1, had a positive impact on price level, and this impact 
lasted for around one year before dwindling. Similar to the previous period, the effect of 
M1 is consistent with economic theories. However, the significance of the impact might 
imply that money supply can be one of the main sources of inflation after 2007.  
Responses of CPI to an increase in PR were slightly positive for the first three months 
and then significantly negative for the next 14 months after completely disappearing. 
While the negative responses can be explained by economic theories as above, the 
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presence of a slightly positive response suggests that there might be a price puzzle here. 
This puzzle indicates that SBV might not use interest rate policy effectively to control 
inflation, or this policy is not the major tool of SBV to manage inflation.  
As illustrated in Figure 10, shocks from CRE exerts a significantly positive impact on CPI.  
In explanation, an increase in domestic credit aggregate means that it can be easier to 
borrow and boost investment, which leads to an increase in output and translate into 
higher inflation. The significance of impact shows that the credit channel might be an 
important one in monetary transmission mechanism for SBV.  
Similarly, shocks from NEER led to significantly positive responses of CPI for eight 
months. Explanations for these positive responses resemble those in the previous period.  
Lastly, among four variables, the responses of CPI to shocks from M1, CRE, and NEER 
seemed to be significant in 2007-2016 while those to shocks from PR might not be 
significant. Therefore, credit channel and exchange rate channel can be more important 
to transmit the effect of monetary policy than interest rate channel in this period. However, 
the responses of CPI to shocks from M1, PR, CRE, and NEER give no conclusion about 
the importance of three channels, since they all seems to be insignificant.  
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6.4.3. Responses of monetary shocks to foreign shocks  
Figure 11: Responses of M1 to foreign shocks, 1998-2006 and 2007-2016 
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In 1998-2006, shocks from oil price had a slightly positive impact on M1 for two months 
and then turned negative for the next three months. While shocks from rice price exerted 
a negative impact on M1 for around four months, and then a positive impact on the next 
four months. However, the responses of M1 to foreign shocks is not statistically significant 
as implied by the confidence interval.  
In 2007-2016, both shocks from oil price and rice price lead to negative responses of M1 
first. The duration of negative impact of oil and rice price were one year and six months 
respectively. Later, the impact of oil diminished while the impact of rice price turned 
positive and last for 18 months. A negative response in money aggregate implies that 
SBV might conduct a contractionary monetary policy after noticing an increase in oil price 
and rice price, which can lead to higher inflation. Positive responses to rice price later 
might suggest that rice price is not a major concern of SBV to design and implement its 
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monetary policy in this period. Furthermore, there might exist a change in the magnitude 
of both impacts on M1, which suggest that SBV has paid more attention to deal with the 
external inflationary factors after 2007.  
Figure 12: Responses of PR to foreign shocks, 1998-2006 and 2007-2016 
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In Figure 12, there is a noticeable difference between the responses of PR to external 
shocks. For 1998-2006, foreign factors might have no impact on PR. However, from 2007 
to 2016, an increase in oil price led to an increase in interest rate PR. An increase in rice 
price first led to a slightly decrease in interest rate but then a noticeable increase in 
interest rate after three months. The positive responses of PR to oil and rice price’s 
shocks suggest that policymakers in Vietnam have implemented a contractionary 
monetary policy to counter the inflationary pressure. However, the abnormal behavior in 
response to rice price at first indicates that policy marker might not place a considerable 
attention to changes in rice price to adjust monetary policy. In addition, an increase in 
FED also exerts a positive impact on PR, overall. This phenomenon can be explained by 
the fact that as foreign interest rate increases, a devaluation of domestic currency can 
happen because foreign currency is now more expensive. To prevent devaluations, the 
central bank might raise the domestic interest rate, and thus, increase the value of 
domestic currency.  
At last, the structural change in the responses of interest rate to foreign factors confirms 
that SBV might be more active in mitigating the effect of external shocks to inflation in 
Vietnam.   
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6.4.4. Responses of monetary shocks to monetary shocks 
Figure 13: Responses of domestic variables to M1 shocks, 1998-2006 and 2007-2016 
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According to economic theories, if M1 increases- ceteris paribus- it is expected that 
interest rate would decrease because when more money is available in the market, the 
cost of borrowing, interest rate, will be lower. The reaction of interest rate, PR, in 1998-
2006 followed this statement. In details, positive innovations of M1 seemed to have a 
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negative impact on PR, and this impact was likely to last for approximately two years 
after completely dwindling. However, in the second period, in response to an increase in 
M1, PR decreased instead of increasing. This liquidity puzzle might result from an 
attempt by policy makers to avoid an increase in price level due to an increase in money 
supply, which might be an outcome of other policies such as fiscal policy. Moreover, it is 
worth to note that during this period, there was a large capital inflow due to WTO 
accession in 2007 (Pham, 2017). Finally, an increase in the magnitude of responses in 
2007-2016 might be an evidence for the rising role of interest rate channel in monetary 
transmission mechanism, but this is not a strong finding due to the large confidence 
interval covers zero.  
As shown in Figure 13, an increase in M1 would lead to a positive response of CRE in 
both periods. Moreover, the significance of the impact in 1998-2006 was greater than 
that in 2007-2016. However, the duration of the impact on CRE seemed to be longer in 
the second period, which was around one and a half year in comparison with that in the 
first – approximately seven months. These differences in two periods certified the 
importance of money aggregate for SBV to manage the credit supply. The significant 
positive responses of CRE in two periods, as illustrated by the confidence interval, 
indicated that credit channel was an important channel for transmitting the effect of 
monetary policy to the economy. Nevertheless, the smaller magnitude of responses in 
the second period implied that the role of this channel in monetary transmission 
mechanism in the later period has reduced.  
For NEER, in the first period, shocks from M1 had a negative impact on NEER first, but 
quickly turned to positive in less than one month, became negative after one month, and 
lasted for more than four months before fading. However, an increase in M1 had a 
positive influence in NEER that remained for one and a half month, then a negative 
influence for more than one months, and a positive one before disappearing in the 
eleventh month. There are several explanations for the inconsistent behaviors of NEER 
in two periods. Besides money supply, other sources such as dollarization, black 
market, and interventions other than monetary policy by the central bank can lead to 
change in the exchange rate (Pham, 2016). For Vietnam, it is likely that dollarization 
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and intervention are important factors to explain the phenomenon. In details, an 
increase in money supply should lead to a depreciation of the domestic currency due to 
its increasing quantity in the market, and this is consistent with the positive responses of 
NEER. However, with the presence of dollarization at 30% (Nguyen, 2012), a fixed 
amount of USD might remain in the economy despites the movements of VND/USD, so 
money supply cannot have the desirous effect on NEER. 
Finally, except for CRE, because the confidence intervals of PR and CRE in both 
periods contain zero along the estimated horizon, arguments presented in these parts 
cannot be claimed to be significant findings.  
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6.5. Variance decomposition of GDP and CPI 
Figure 14: Variance decomposition of GDP and CPI, 1998-2006
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As shown in the figure above, in 1998-2000, GDP and CPI was the main elements that 
contributed to their variance. The contribution of GDP to its own variance decreased 
significantly from 90% to less than 80% in four months and then remained unchanged as 
the time horizon increased. However, the contribution of CPI to its own variance 
decreased over the time horizon of three years and reached 70% in the end.  
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In this period, one can see that the second largest source of variation in GDP and CPI 
was rice price with approximately 10% of GDP and 15% of CPI. This result is consistent 
with the fact that rice is a main exportable good and a primary commodity in Vietnam.  
However, while the remaining factors contributed insignificantly to variation in GDP, as 
the time horizon increased, world oil price and Federal fund rate became more important 
in explaining for the error variance of CPI. Especially, at the end, the contribution of world 
oil price and Federal fund rate are almost identical to that of rice price. This result 
suggests that despites the relatively closeness of Vietnamese economy, external factors 
can still be the main source of price level fluctuations in the long term. 
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Figure 15: Variance decomposition of GDP and CPI, 2007-2016 
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From 2007 to 2016, GDP and CPI were also the main factors that account for their 
variation. The contribution of GDP to its own variance is 100% and decreased to less than 
90% in five months. At the start, CPI explained about more than 80% of its own variation, 
but after 10 months, this number reduced to less than 40%.  
While it is obvious that all other variables except GDP only had a negligible contribution 
to GDP variance, other variables could account for most of the CPI variance. The second 
largest source was world oil price, and the third source was domestic credit aggregate. 
Moreover, external shocks explained a large proportion of CPI variance with more than 
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30% after two months. Monetary policy shocks also accounted for approximately 30% of 
CPI variance in total, but their contributions were slightly smaller than those of external 
shocks were. 
6.6. Main findings 
In general, these are the key findings of the analysis: 
 GDP was more responsive to foreign shocks in 2007-2016 than in 1998-2006, but 
the significance of responses was inconclusive.  
 Only the impact of world rice price on price level in Vietnam was statistically 
significant in 1998-2006, while the impacts of all world oil price, world rice price, and 
Federal Fund Rate were significant in the later period.  
 The magnitude and length of the responses of GDP to shocks from monetary 
policy seemed to be larger in 2007-2016 than in 1998-2006. However, there is no 
statistical evidence of significant responses in two periods. 
 In 1998-2006, credit channel might not be the primary tool to control inflation, and 
in 2007-2016, credit channel and exchange rate channel had an important role for 
transmitting the effects of monetary policy. The central bank might not use the interest 
rate channel to manage inflation effectively in 2007-2016, or this is not an important 
instrument of SBV. Moreover, money supply could be the source of inflation after 2007.  
 External shocks seemed to have no impact on interest rate in 1998-2006. SBV 
might be more active in counter the inflationary pressure from external sources using 
money supply and interest rate in 2007-2016. 
 The credit channel is a major channel in transmitting the effect of monetary policy, 
but the importance of credit channel has reduced after 2007. The role of interest rate 
channel might be larger in 2007-2016 than in 1998-2006, but there is insufficient evidence 
63 
 
that this is a major channel. Similar, no conclusion about the importance of exchange rate 
channel can be reached. 
 In both periods, the main contributors of variation in GDP and CPI were their own 
shocks. 
 In 1998-2006, the second largest source of GDI and CPI variance were world rice 
price. External shocks could still account for a significant proportion of variation in CPI in 
the long term (at the end of three years). 
 In 2007-2016, all other variables except GDP had an insignificant contribution to 
GDP variance. The main sources of CPI variance were world oil price and domestic credit 
aggregate. In total, external factors explained more than 30% of CPI variance when 
monetary policy shocks explained slightly less, approximately 30%. 
  
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7. DISCUSSIONS 
This section deals with the last research question: ‘What is the implications for monetary 
policy in Vietnam?’. Firstly, a discussion about different channels of monetary 
transmission mechanism will be presented with some information about the structure of 
Vietnamese economy and monetary policy. Secondly, a deep examination of the 
structural changes of Vietnamese economy after 2007 will be conducted. Thirdly, from 
the previous discussion, recommendations for monetary policy in Vietnam will be covered.  
7.1. Channels of monetary transmission mechanism: 
Before 2007, empirical results showed that credit channel played an important role in 
monetary transmission mechanism. This is not a surprising finding. As discussed in 
section 2, restrictions on foreign exchange market and foreign currency transactions still 
existed in this period and led to limited capital inflows. Therefore, for an emerging and 
closed economy like Vietnam, it is easier for the central bank to control the liquidity of the 
economy through bank credit. The relative immature of securities and equity markets also 
contribute to the dominant role of credit channel. Furthermore, it is worth to note that five 
SOCBs had the largest market share in the banking sector, which facilitate the ability of 
SBV to inject money into the economy through lending to these banks. 
Interest rate channel only had an insignificant role. Moreover, the linkage between 
domestic interest rate and Federal Fund Rate is comparatively weak in both periods. 
Although an immature financial market reduces the effectiveness of the interest rate 
channel to transmit effects of monetary policy (Camen, 2006), it was likely that SBV did 
not focus on and use interest rate policy as a primary component of monetary policy from 
1998 to 2016. Another reason for this ineffectiveness is the dominance of SOCBs in the 
banking sector. Because SOEs is the major customers of SOCBs, it can be the case that 
these SOEs enjoy a more favorable interest rate (Pham, 2016).  
7.2. Changes after 2007 
External factors had a larger impact on domestic factors, namely GDP and CPI. 
Especially, external factors were found to have a significant impact on price level as 
shown in the impulse response and variance decomposition results. The possibility that 
money supply could be the source of inflation after 2007 and the presence of price puzzle 
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can suggest the limited ability of SBV to use monetary policy to control inflation. However, 
it is worth to note that SBV has become more concerned towards inflationary pressure 
from external factors.  
The higher contribution of monetary policy shocks to variation in CPI in 2007-2016 
compared to that in 1998-2006 (approximately 30% to 5%), and the fact that domestic 
credit is the third biggest contributor can be evidence of the ineffectiveness of monetary 
policy. Moreover, according to Pham (2016), and Nguyen and Nguyen (2010), a large 
capital inflow after 2007 had not been successfully sterilized by SBV, and contributed to 
high inflation in 2007-2011. In addition, the rising role of the interbank transaction adds 
more complications to the situation as banks now can create new money when making 
loans and borrowing from each other with less dependence on money supply from the 
central bank (McLeay et al., 2014, and Pham, 2016). Therefore, in such a complicated 
environment, SBV needs to adopt new instruments and approaches to be able to reach 
its goals. 
7.3. Recommendations for monetary policy 
7.3.1. The goal of monetary policy 
The multi-objectives of monetary policy in Vietnam has received a lot of criticisms in 
literature (Mai, 2007, To et al. 2012, and Nguyen, 2014), and from the empirical results, 
one might see that price stability was not the primary goal of monetary policy in Vietnam. 
Moreover, there is a consensus that price stability should be the major objective of 
monetary policy (Bernanke, 2001, and Mai, 2007). Mai (2007) argues that setting price 
stability as the primary goal will help SBV to conduct better monetary policy. This can help 
to increase the credibility of the central bank and keep inflation expectation in control. A 
success in control inflation expectation can help to maintain inflation at a stable and 
appropriate level. Moreover, choosing price stability as a primary does not mean that SBV 
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must forego other objectives as presented in the study of Mai (2007). However, further 
details are beyond the scope of this study.  
In conclusion, SBV should give the priority of monetary policy to price stability. 
7.3.2. The independence of the central bank 
As discussed in section 2, SBV does not have a sufficient independence as a central 
bank to conduct monetary policy as the final decision belongs to the government and 
National Assembly. However, as mentioned in studies, the central bank should be given 
more independence to be able to conduct an effective monetary policy (Blanchard and 
Johnson, 2013). One argument for this independence is a central bank with high 
independence is more likely to avoid the mistake of trying to pursue high economic growth 
and sacrifice price stability, which can lead to a substantive increase in inflation and hurt 
the poorest class in the country (Mai, 2007). 
7.3.3. Monetary transmission channels 
As the economic environment is becoming more dynamics, SBV should improve and use 
all the channels to transmit the effect of monetary policy. In order to achieve this 
effectiveness, SBV needs to improve some elements in each channel. 
The interest rate channel: 
- The ful liberalization of the interest rate is of vital importance. As argued by 
Bhattacharya (2014), the liberalization of interest rate can help to keep the price 
level stable and mitigate the unfavorable impact of external shocks on the 
economy. Because when letting the market determines the interest rate, it is more 
likely that the existing interest rate is the most effective rate at which the quantities 
of money demand and supply equal. When there is a shock to the market, it is 
easy to reach the new equilibrium. In case the interest rate is regulated, it is more 
likely that the rate in the market is not at equilibrium, and when shocks hit the 
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market, it is much harder to reach the new equilibrium and this disequilibrium in 
the market can translate into negative impacts on macroeconomic variables. 
- SBV also needs to erase the relationship between SOCBs and SOEs to prevent 
any violation of the market rate, and this can help to reduce bad debts as well as 
allow the interest rate channel to work effectively. 
The credit channel: 
- It is shown that the credit channel has become less important. Moreover, the 
complication of the environment after 2007 has led to the loss of control over 
money aggregate of SBV (Pham, 2016). Therefore, these suggest that SBV should 
not pay too much attention to this channel in conducting its monetary policy. 
The exchange rate channel: 
- For the current situation, a pegged exchange rate is appropriate. A fixed exchange 
regime will make the economy more vulnerable to foreign shocks, especially 
inflation in Vietnam after 2007 has already experienced a large influence from 
external shocks. However, adopting a floating regime is not a wise choice for a 
small economy like Vietnam (Hammond et al., 2009).  
- SBV also needs to balance between the desirous exchange rate and foreign 
investment as implying by the Trilemma rule (Pham, 2016).   
7.3.4. Recommendations in the long term: 
- The government should attempt to promote the development of the financial 
system. As seen from the discussion above, financial system play an important 
role in designing and implementing an effective monetary policy. Some 
suggestions for financial liberalization in Vietnam are privatizing SOCBs, 
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promoting the development of JSCBs, improve the financial markets, encouraging 
the development of foreign exchange market. 
- When conditions of the financial system and international capital market are 
sufficient, SBV can consider to undertake a floating exchange regime as well as 
try new monetary policy regime, namely inflation targeting.   
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8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCHES 
8.1. Main findings 
This study attempts to find the answer to these questions: 
1) How do macroeconomic variables affect output and inflation in Vietnam? 
In 1998-2006, increases in world oil price and Federal Fund Rate seemed to have positive 
impacts on output while the impact of rice price fluctuated. Moreover, output was likely to 
be most responsive to shocks from policy rate.  
In 2007-2016, increases in world rice price and Federal Fund Rate seemed to have 
negative impacts on output, but the world oil price exerted fluctuated impact on output. 
The responses of output to exchange rate’s shocks is the largest.  
In 1998-2006, increases in world oil price and world rice price might lead to an increase 
in price level, but increases in Federal Fund Rate lead to a slightly decrease. Price level 
seemed to not responsive to shocks from monetary policy 
In 2006-2016, increases in world oil price and world rice price led to an increase in price 
level, but the responses of CPI to an increase in Federal Fund Rate was negative and 
then positive. Furthermore, price level increased in response to an increase in money 
supply, and domestic credit aggregate. It also tended to increase in response to a 
devaluation of VND. Finally, it is possible that an increase in interest rate lead to a 
decrease in inflation despites a small increase in the first period.  
2) How significantly do domestic and foreign variables affect output and inflation in 
Vietnam? 
The effects of domestic and foreign variables on output are insignificant in both periods. 
However, the impacts on inflation of world rice price in 1998-2006, and of world oil price, 
world rice price and Federal Rate Fund in 2007-2016 is significant. For domestic variables, 
the effects of money supply, domestic credit aggregate, and exchange rate are all 
significant in 2007-2016. 
3) What are the main drivers of output growth and inflation in the short-term? 
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The main drivers of output growth in 1998-2006 are itself and world oil price, but for 1998-
2006, the main driver of output is only itself.  
The main drivers of inflation in 1998-2006 are itself and external factors, namely world oil 
price, world rice price and Federal Fund Rate. However, the main drivers of inflation from 
2007 to 2016 are itself, world oil price and domestic credit aggregate. Moreover, the total 
contributions of both foreign shocks and shocks from monetary policy are around 30%.  
4) What are the implications for monetary policy in Vietnam? 
These are some recommendation for monetary policy in Vietnam: 
- The goal of monetary policy: the priority of monetary policy should be given to price 
stability 
- The independence of the central bank: more independence should be given to 
SBV in designing and conducting monetary policy. 
- Monetary transmission channels: 
o Liberalization of interest rate 
o Less attention to the credit channel 
o Pegged exchange rate with more flexibility 
o Balancing between exchange rate and foreign investment 
- Long-term recommendation: 
o Developing the financial system and international capital market 
(government) 
o Moving to inflation targeting and floating exchange rate regime  
Finally, as the effects of external factors on Vietnamese economy are larger after 2007, 
it is recommended that SBV pays attention to movements of these variables and adjust 
the policy suitably. 
8.2. Suggestions for Further Research 
Due to some limitations in methodology and the availability of data, this study is still 
incomplete. Future researches on this topic can focus on examining the long-term 
relationships of variables using approaches like VECM. Moreover, the study only focuses 
on a small set of variables, and it is likely that some important variables are omitted. 
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Therefore, more variables should be evaluated and added to the model so that the 
relationships and effects of monetary transmission mechanisms on domestic variables 
can be fully explained. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Variable’s graphs and residual plots of VAR (2) 
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In logarithm forms (not included FED and PR) 
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In first difference and logarithm forms (not included FED and PR) 
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Residual plots 
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Appendix B: Summary of tests to set up model identification 
Interest rate channel 
1998-2006 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 04/07/17   Time: 19:37  
Sample: 1998M11 2006M12  
Included observations: 92  
    
        
Dependent variable: POLICY_RATE  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCPI  2.491404 6  0.8694 
DLGDP  25.27968 6  0.0003 
DLM1  1.193593 6  0.9772 
    
    All  31.21654 18  0.0272 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLCPI  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    POLICY_RATE  19.67088 6  0.0032 
DLGDP  9.212955 6  0.1620 
DLM1  4.531789 6  0.6051 
    
    All  29.64316 18  0.0411 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLGDP  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    POLICY_RATE  50.74187 6  0.0000 
DLCPI  3.008861 6  0.8077 
DLM1  4.488385 6  0.6109 
    
    All  68.66386 18  0.0000 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLM1  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    POLICY_RATE  13.00332 6  0.0430 
DLCPI  2.230614 6  0.8973 
DLGDP  9.179306 6  0.1637 
    
    All  34.36502 18  0.0113 
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2007-2016 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 04/07/17   Time: 19:34  
Sample: 2007M01 2016M10  
Included observations: 118  
    
        
Dependent variable: DLCPI  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLGDP  7.943965 6  0.2422 
DLM1  15.47820 6  0.0168 
POLICY_RATE  4.881811 6  0.5591 
    
    All  31.41498 18  0.0258 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLGDP  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCPI  3.220231 6  0.7807 
DLM1  1.885677 6  0.9299 
POLICY_RATE  5.094275 6  0.5318 
    
    All  12.49407 18  0.8207 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLM1  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCPI  13.88869 6  0.0309 
DLGDP  2.667235 6  0.8493 
POLICY_RATE  5.936071 6  0.4304 
    
    All  25.16891 18  0.1203 
    
        
Dependent variable: POLICY_RATE  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCPI  36.50453 6  0.0000 
DLGDP  2.240258 6  0.8963 
DLM1  13.21310 6  0.0398 
    
    All  57.58312 18  0.0000 
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Credit channel 
1998-2006 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 03/17/17   Time: 23:29  
Sample: 1998M11 2006M12  
Included observations: 92  
    
        
Dependent variable: DLCPI  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCRE  1.237986 6  0.9750 
DLGDP  5.045733 6  0.5380 
DLM1  2.452602 6  0.8737 
    
    All  9.089391 18  0.9576 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLCRE  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCPI  5.825143 6  0.4431 
DLGDP  21.55273 6  0.0015 
DLM1  10.60037 6  0.1015 
    
    All  40.13811 18  0.0020 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLGDP  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCPI  7.821588 6  0.2515 
DLCRE  13.13343 6  0.0410 
DLM1  8.960079 6  0.1758 
    
    All  25.33087 18  0.1161 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLM1  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCPI  3.436502 6  0.7524 
DLCRE  5.133601 6  0.5268 
DLGDP  7.977999 6  0.2397 
    
    All  24.39401 18  0.1425 
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2007-2016 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 03/18/17   Time: 11:57  
Sample: 2007M01 2016M10  
Included observations: 118  
    
        
Dependent variable: DLCPI  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCRE  14.35472 6  0.0259 
DLGDP  7.976527 6  0.2398 
DLM1  7.975095 6  0.2399 
    
    All  43.45575 18  0.0007 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLCRE  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCPI  8.271294 6  0.2189 
DLGDP  2.405316 6  0.8789 
DLM1  16.33095 6  0.0121 
    
    All  26.78910 18  0.0830 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLGDP  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCPI  1.834165 6  0.9343 
DLCRE  3.087624 6  0.7978 
DLM1  3.770308 6  0.7077 
    
    All  10.33604 18  0.9204 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLM1  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCPI  8.527376 6  0.2020 
DLCRE  2.632708 6  0.8533 
DLGDP  2.137136 6  0.9067 
    
    All  21.22338 18  0.2683 
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Exchange rate channel 
1998-2006 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 03/17/17   Time: 23:40  
Sample: 1998M11 2006M12  
Included observations: 92  
    
        
Dependent variable: DEXIM  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCPI  9.996847 6  0.1248 
DLGDP  2.840550 6  0.8286 
DLM1  5.319612 6  0.5035 
DLNEER  1.393869 6  0.9662 
    
    All  19.44958 24  0.7276 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLCPI  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DEXIM  6.351385 6  0.3850 
DLGDP  4.827372 6  0.5661 
DLM1  3.166184 6  0.7877 
DLNEER  7.697868 6  0.2611 
    
    All  20.06351 24  0.6932 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLGDP  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DEXIM  13.53296 6  0.0353 
DLCPI  7.510664 6  0.2762 
DLM1  5.419474 6  0.4912 
DLNEER  3.620610 6  0.7279 
    
    All  28.59607 24  0.2357 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLM1  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DEXIM  8.471030 6  0.2056 
DLCPI  2.862515 6  0.8259 
DLGDP  12.85371 6  0.0454 
DLNEER  9.874659 6  0.1300 
    
    All  37.38954 24  0.0400 
    
    
91 
 
    
Dependent variable: DLNEER  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DEXIM  6.688158 6  0.3507 
DLCPI  12.04534 6  0.0610 
DLGDP  3.327088 6  0.7668 
DLM1  9.700976 6  0.1378 
    
    All  27.75829 24  0.2704 
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2007-2016 
 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 03/18/17   Time: 12:07  
Sample: 2007M01 2016M10  
Included observations: 118  
    
        
Dependent variable: DEXIM  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DLCPI  5.589386 6  0.4707 
DLGDP  3.812614 6  0.7020 
DLM1  23.76239 6  0.0006 
DLNEER  17.76295 6  0.0069 
    
    All  74.17951 24  0.0000 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLCPI  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DEXIM  10.51813 6  0.1045 
DLGDP  11.68341 6  0.0694 
DLM1  13.18838 6  0.0401 
DLNEER  17.56408 6  0.0074 
    
    All  58.81262 24  0.0001 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLGDP  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DEXIM  1.499579 6  0.9595 
DLCPI  3.065884 6  0.8005 
DLM1  2.511392 6  0.8672 
DLNEER  3.658455 6  0.7228 
    
    All  11.96213 24  0.9803 
    
        
Dependent variable: DLM1  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DEXIM  3.534434 6  0.7394 
DLCPI  12.96890 6  0.0435 
DLGDP  2.633791 6  0.8532 
DLNEER  5.229513 6  0.5147 
    
    All  30.44381 24  0.1705 
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Dependent variable: DLNEER  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    DEXIM  3.569375 6  0.7347 
DLCPI  1.603945 6  0.9523 
DLGDP  2.000791 6  0.9196 
DLM1  7.607126 6  0.2683 
    
    All  15.94802 24  0.8899 
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Reports of VAR Stability 
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All the VAR models used to set up the identification satisfy the stability condition.  
Unit root tests of EXIM 
 Level First difference 
AIC p-value AIC p-value 
Intercept and trend -3.097564 0.0282 -7.286633 0.0000 
Intercept -3.273954 0.0734 -7.305860 0.0000 
None 0.001069  0.6819 -7.286175 0.0000 
 
Based on results of unit root tests of EXIM, this study takes the first difference of this 
variable before estimating the VAR models to guarantee the stationary requirements for 
data.  
